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______________ 
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On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
United States Department of Justice  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
Agency No. A074-862-076 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
______________ 
 
Argued October 3, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
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_____________ 
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Joshua S. Bolian    [ARGUED] 
Robbins Russell Englert Orseck Untereiner & Sauber 
2000 K Street, N.W.  
4th Floor  
Washington, DC 20006 
 
Counsel for Petitioner** 
 
Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director 
Jonathan A. Robbins     [ARGUED] 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
Counsel for Respondent 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Zhi Fei Liao petitions for review of a decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal 
                                              
** Attorney for Petitioner appeared pro bono, and his 
service is in the highest tradition of our profession.  We thank 
him for his representation in this case.  
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of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order removing him from the 
United States based upon his alleged commission of a “crime 
of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  Because the elements of his crime of 
conviction, endangering the welfare of a child under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(1), do not match the elements of the 
crime of “child abuse” under the INA, the order of removal was 
improperly entered.  Therefore, we will grant the petition for 
review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.  
 
I 
 
Liao, a native and citizen of China, became a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States in 2005.  On April 18, 
2015, Liao had a physical altercation with his girlfriend, Yin 
Yu.  A neighbor called the police, and Yu told the responding 
police officers that she was holding her infant son, J.Y., while 
Liao struck her, but that J.Y. was not “hit or hurt” during this 
encounter.  She said, however, that at some point during the 
fight, J.Y. was placed on the bed and fell from the bed to the 
floor.  Officers arrested Liao, charging him with three offenses, 
including endangering the welfare of a child in violation of 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(1).  Liao was convicted and served 
106 days of his 90-330 day prison sentence.     
 
Following Liao’s release from state custody, the 
Department of Homeland Security served Liao with a notice 
that he was subject to removal for, among other things, 
committing “a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, 
or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment,” 
which rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).1  The IJ ordered Liao’s removal, holding 
that endangering the welfare of children in violation of 
Pennsylvania law constituted a “crime of child abuse, child 
neglect, or child abandonment,” within the meaning of the 
INA.2  Liao appealed, and the BIA held, in a single member, 
non-precedential decision, that Liao was subject to removal 
based on his child endangerment conviction.  Reasoning that 
the definition of “child abuse” under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) “is not 
limited to offenses that require proof of harm or injury,” the 
BIA held that Pennsylvania’s child endangerment crime fell 
within § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)’s “broad definition” of child abuse.  
Liao petitions for review. 
                                              
1 Initially, Liao received a notice to appear for removal 
proceedings that cited his simple assault conviction as the basis 
for his removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  However, 
following the IJ’s determination that it would be “difficult to 
show” removability based on a violation of Pennsylvania’s 
simple assault statute, J.A. 524, the Government served an 
amended notice that instead claimed Liao’s child 
endangerment and terroristic threat convictions rendered him 
removable under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
2 The IJ also held, in the alternative, that Liao’s 
conviction for making terroristic threats in violation of 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1) was sufficient to remove him under  
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  The BIA declined to reach the IJ’s alternate 
ground, upholding the removal order solely based on Liao’s 
violation of Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute.  
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II3 
 
A 
When the BIA issues its own opinion on the merits, we 
review the BIA’s decision, not that of the IJ.  Mahn v. Att’y 
Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).  
However, where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts portions of 
the IJ’s opinion, we review both the IJ and BIA decisions.  
Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Typically, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal determinations de 
novo . . . subject to the principles of deference set forth in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984).”  Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 
F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  When “we are 
asked to review an unpublished, non-precedential decision 
issued by a single BIA member,” however, we defer to the 
BIA’s legal determinations only insofar as they have the power 
to persuade.  Mahn, 767 F.3d at 173.   
 
B 
 
 Before reaching the merits of Liao’s claim, we must 
determine whether he exhausted his administrative remedies as 
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(2).  To obtain judicial review, 
“an alien is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as 
to each claim or ground for relief.”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
                                              
3 The IJ had jurisdiction over Liao’s immigration 
proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2, and the BIA had 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) 
and 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction over final orders of the BIA 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted).  We do not apply this principle “in a draconian 
fashion,” however.  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Under our “liberal exhaustion policy . . . , an alien 
need not do much to alert the Board that he is raising an issue.”  
Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[S]o 
long as an immigration petitioner makes some effort, however 
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward 
issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have 
exhausted [his] administrative remedies.”  Lin, 543 F.3d at 121 
(citations omitted). 
 
 The purpose of administrative exhaustion “is to ensure 
that the agency is given an opportunity to resolve issues raised 
before it prior to any judicial intervention.”  Hoxha v. Holder, 
559 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  Thus, the 
question is not whether the petitioner used magic words from 
a particular legal standard or even cited to the relevant case law 
regarding an issue, but rather whether there is “sufficient 
information available to the Board . . . to put it on notice of the 
issue being raised.” 4  Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 
422 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005).  Therefore, while a petitioner who 
completely omits an issue fails to meet the exhaustion 
requirement with respect to that issue, see Abdulrahman, 330 
                                              
4 The Government is mistaken as to how our liberal 
exhaustion policy works.  It does not require liberally 
construing a party’s pleadings as we must for pro se litigants.  
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).  Rather, it 
requires examining the pleadings expansively to determine 
whether they alert the BIA to an issue that a party wants to be 
reviewed.  Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 595.  
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F.3d at 595, a petitioner who gives enough information to put 
the BIA on notice that he is raising an issue has exhausted the 
issue, and we have jurisdiction to review it.    
 
 Here, though Liao did not squarely present in his notice 
of appeal his claim that the Pennsylvania statute does not 
require sufficient risk to a child’s welfare to be considered a 
crime of child abuse under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), he argued, 
through counsel, that violation of the “duty of care, protection 
or support” described under Pennsylvania’s child 
endangerment statute did not require the type of conduct 
necessary to constitute a “crime of child abuse” under the INA.  
J.A. 59-61.  Liao’s argument on this issue was sufficient to 
notify the BIA not only that he was contesting whether the 
conviction for child endangerment rendered him removable 
(the degree of notification required by Yan Lan Wu, 393 F.3d 
at 422, for exhaustion) but, in addition, that the ground for his 
position was the contention that the level of risk that must be 
shown to violate Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute 
did not correspond with the level of risk needed to commit the 
crime of child abuse as provided for in the INA.   
 
The BIA’s ruling also reflects that it was aware Liao 
disputed that his conviction rendered him removable and that 
he challenged whether his crime of conviction constituted the 
crime of “child abuse” under the INA.  The BIA held that it 
was, which required it to determine whether the Pennsylvania 
crime met the INA’s risk requirement.  Thus, the BIA decided 
the issue we are asked to consider.  The BIA’s actions further 
support our conclusion that Liao exhausted his argument, and 
we have jurisdiction to analyze his assertion that his child 
endangerment conviction is not categorically a “crime of child 
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abuse” under the INA.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), 
1252(d)(1); Hoxha, 559 F.3d at 163. 
 
III 
 
A 
 
 Our analysis of Liao’s claim requires us to determine 
the meaning of the phrase “crime of child abuse” under the 
INA.  The INA does not provide a definition but the BIA has 
interpreted this phrase. 
 
 The BIA first defined the phrase “crime of child abuse” 
in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 512 
(B.I.A. 2008), interpreting it broadly to encompass:  
 
any offense involving an intentional, knowing, 
reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission 
that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that 
impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, 
including sexual abuse or exploitation.  At a 
minimum, this definition encompasses 
convictions for offenses involving the infliction 
on a child of physical harm, even if slight; mental 
or emotional harm, including acts injurious to 
morals; sexual abuse, including direct acts of 
sexual contact, but also including acts that 
induce (or omissions that permit) a child to 
engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct . . . . 
 
Building on this definition, in Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
at 381-83 (B.I.A. 2010), the BIA interpreted the phrase “crime 
of child abuse” to also capture some “child endangerment” 
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statutes, which criminalize not just harm to children, but acts 
that present different levels of risk of harm to children.  
Specifically, the BIA observed: 
 
[s]tates use various terms to describe the level of 
threat required [for violation of their child 
endangerment statutes], including “realistic,” 
“serious,” “reasonably foreseeable,” 
“substantial,” or “genuine.”  Since the meaning 
of a term such as “substantial” could be subject 
to different interpretations by courts in each 
State, we will not attempt to analyze whether the 
myriad State formulations of endangerment-type 
child abuse offenses come within the ambit of 
“child abuse” under [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)].  Rather, we find that a State-
by-State analysis is appropriate to determine 
whether the risk of harm required by the 
endangerment-type language in any given State 
statute is sufficient to bring an offense within the 
definition of “child abuse” under the Act.  
 
Id. at 382-83.  Mindful of these differences, the BIA in Soram 
analyzed the child endangerment subsection of Colorado’s 
child abuse statute, which makes it illegal to “permit[] a child 
to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of 
injury to the child’s life or health.”  Id. at 379-80 (citing Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-6-401(1)(a)).  Examining the statute’s 
legislative history and case law interpretations, the BIA 
concluded that the Colorado child endangerment offense was 
categorically a “crime of child abuse” under the INA, pointing 
out that it required “a knowing or reckless act” that creates “at 
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least a reasonable probability that the child’s life or health will 
be endangered.”  Id. at 385-86 (emphases omitted).  
 
 In Matter of Mendoza Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. 703 
(B.I.A. 2016), the BIA examined the New York child 
endangerment statute5 to determine whether its “formulation[] 
of endangerment-type child abuse offenses come[s] within the 
ambit of ‘child abuse,’” Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 383, under 
the INA.  The BIA held that the New York statute’s 
“elements—a knowing mental state coupled with an act or acts 
creating a likelihood of harm to a child—fit within our 
definition of a ‘crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child 
abandonment’ in section [1227(a)(2)(E)(i)].”  Mendoza 
Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 706.  In reaching this holding, the 
BIA recognized that:  
 
there are child endangerment statues that do not 
require a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child 
to meet the definition of child abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment under the Act.  For example, the 
child endangerment statute at section 273a(b) of 
the California Penal Code criminalizes conduct 
that places a child “in a situation where his or her 
person or health may be endangered.” (Emphasis 
added.)  In Fregozo v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1030 
(9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit held that this 
                                              
5 Section 260.10(1) of the New York Penal Law 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person is guilty of 
endangering the welfare of a child when . . . [h]e or she 
knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the 
physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen 
years old . . . .” 
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statute did not categorically define a “crime of 
child abuse” within the meaning of the Act.  The 
court observed that the statute does not “require 
that the circumstances create any particular 
likelihood of harm to a child” and punishes 
“conduct that creates only the bare potential for 
nonserious harm to a child.”  Id. at 1037-38.  In 
this regard, the court cited as an example of facts 
that did not meet our definition of child abuse the 
case of a parent “placing an unattended infant in 
the middle of a tall bed without a railing, even 
though the child was never injured.”  Id.  Based 
on the facts as construed by the court, we would 
agree that they do not, alone, define a crime of 
child abuse or neglect. 
 
Id. at 711.  Thus, to qualify as a crime of child abuse under the 
INA, a state child endangerment offense must require that the 
actor’s conduct “create [a] particular likelihood of harm to the 
child” that rises above “conduct that creates only the bare 
potential for nonserious harm. . . .” Id. (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  As a result, where a state child 
endangerment statute fails to require “any particular likelihood 
of harm to a child,” id. (quoting Fregozo, 576 F.3d at 1037), it 
falls outside the ambit of the INA’s “child abuse” offense.  
 
 Recognizing that the phrase “child abuse” has different 
meanings in different states, and that child abuse in this context 
is meant to address conduct that is criminal, it is appropriate to 
define the phrase “child abuse” under the INA to capture 
conduct that poses a particular likelihood of harm to the child.  
Using this definition, we next examine whether the 
Pennsylvania child endangerment statute constitutes a “crime 
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of child abuse” under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  If so, then a 
conviction under the Pennsylvania statute provides a basis for 
removal. 
 
 
B 
 
 To decide whether a state conviction qualifies as a basis 
for removal under the INA, we “employ a ‘categorical 
approach’ to determine whether the state offense is comparable 
to [the] offense listed in the INA.”  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 
U.S. 184, 190 (2013); see also Descamps v. United States, 570 
U.S. 254, 257 (2013) (describing categorical approach 
generally).  Because we focus on the elements of the offense 
of conviction, a petitioner’s specific conduct that led to the 
conviction is “irrelevant.”  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 
(citation omitted).   
 
Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] parent, guardian or other 
person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, 
or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits 
an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child 
by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 4304(a)(1).  In construing this provision, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that, notwithstanding 
the rule of lenity typically applied to penal statutes, the child 
endangerment provision “must be construed to effectuate its 
broad purpose of sheltering children from harm.  Specifically, 
the purpose of such juvenile statutes is defensive; they are 
written expansively by the legislature to cover a broad range of 
conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of our 
children.”  Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 
2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
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Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute has thus been 
construed to “impose[] a duty on parents and other caretakers 
to not risk any kind of harm, not just bodily injury, to a minor 
child in his or her care.”  Commonwealth v. Coppedge, 984 
A.2d 562, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (examining the elements 
of Pennsylvania’s child endangerment offense to determine if 
it merged with simple assault).  Thus, “a conviction for 
endangering the welfare of children only requires proof of 
circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or 
psychological welfare.”  Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 
327, 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)6; see also Commonwealth v. 
                                              
6 In Martir, the Pennsylvania Superior Court examined 
the question of whether a conviction for child endangerment 
merges for sentencing purposes with, as a lesser included 
offense, a conviction for reckless endangerment.  712 A.2d at 
328.  The reckless endangerment statute in question provided, 
in full, that “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second 
degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may 
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 
injury.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705.  The court held that the 
convictions did not merge, reasoning, as relevant for our 
purposes, that:  
 
[a] conviction for reckless endangerment 
requires proof of conduct that places or may 
place another person in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury, while a conviction for 
endangering the welfare of children only 
requires proof of circumstances that could 
threaten the child’s physical or psychological 
welfare.  Thus, reckless endangerment requires 
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Young, No. 2556 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 238469, at *4 (Pa. 
Super Ct. 2017) (not precedential) (observing that the child 
endangerment offense requires only “proof of circumstances 
that could threaten the child” (quoting Martir, 712 A.2d at 
330)).7 
                                              
proof of a fact that endangering the welfare of 
children does not.  In other words, the element of 
conduct which places or may place a person in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury is not 
subsumed within proof that a child is placed in 
circumstance[s] that could threaten the child.  
 
Martir, 712 A.2d at 329-30.  
7 Citing to Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485, 
490 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the Government contends that 
Pennsylvania “caselaw has in fact narrowed the [child 
endangerment] statute to proscribe practical certainty that 
conduct threatens a child’s physical or psychological welfare.”  
Aug. 15 DOJ Letter at 2.  The Government is mistaken.  The 
passage the Government refers to was discussing the mental 
state required for conviction under the statute, stating that “it is 
the awareness by the accused that his violation of his duty of 
care, protection and support is ‘practically certain’ to result in 
the endangerment to his children’s welfare, which is proscribed 
by the statute.”  Wallace, 817 A.2d at 492 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 302(b)(2) (describing “general requirements of 
culpability” under Pennsylvania criminal law)).  The present 
dispute does not concern the mental state required to commit 
the offense; rather, what is at issue here is the meaning of 
“endangerment,” which Wallace defines as putting “at risk of 
danger,” specifying that neither “actual infliction” nor 
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 Comparing the Pennsylvania child endangerment 
statute to the offense of “child abuse” under the INA reveals a 
difference between each statute’s risk requirements.  Whereas 
the Pennsylvania statute merely requires conduct that “could 
threaten” a child’s “welfare,” Martir, 712 A.2d at 330, “child 
abuse” under the INA requires “a likelihood of harm to [the] 
child.”  Mendoza Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 706.  The BIA has 
not identified a specific risk level, but it does embrace the view 
that a statute that does not “‘require . . . any particular 
likelihood of harm to a child’” would not include “a 
sufficiently high risk of harm to a child” to qualify as INA child 
abuse.  Id. at 711 (quoting Fregozo, 576 F.3d at 1037-38).  This 
required risk level places a reasonable limitation on the 
offenses that constitute “child abuse” under the INA.  Florez v. 
Holder, 779 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 
Like the California statute our sister circuit examined in 
Fregozo, the Pennsylvania statute lacks an element requiring 
proof of a “sufficiently high risk of harm.”  Mendoza Osorio, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 711 (emphasis omitted).  The Pennsylvania 
statute makes it illegal to place the child in “circumstances that 
could threaten [his or her] welfare.”  Martir, 712 A.2d at 330.  
The California statute makes it illegal to place a child “in a 
situation where his or her person or health may be 
endangered.”  Fregozo, 576 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Cal. Penal 
Code § 273a(b)).  Like the California statute, the Pennsylvania 
                                              
“imminent threat of physical injury” to the child is required for 
conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(1),  id. at 491-
92, and which other Pennsylvania courts have defined as 
conduct that “could threaten” a child’s welfare.  Martir, 712 
A.2d at 330.  
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statute does not specify “any particular likelihood of harm to a 
child” required for violation.  Mendoza Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
at 711 (internal citation omitted).  Because “child abuse” under 
the INA requires a specified risk of harm that rises above 
conduct that creates only the bare potential for non-serious 
harm, id., and the Pennsylvania child endangerment statute in 
effect at the time of Liao’s conviction did not,8 the elements of 
the two statutes do not match.  As a result, under the categorical 
approach, Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute under 
which Liao was convicted does not fit within the definition of 
“child abuse” under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and the BIA erred in 
concluding otherwise.   
 
C 
 
 The Government claims that we must also engage in a 
“realistic probability” inquiry, examining convictions under 
the state statute to assess “whether the statute is actually 
applied to conduct that falls outside of the federal definition,” 
Resp’t’s Br. at 31-32, before concluding the statute does not 
                                              
8 In 2017, the grading portion of the Pennsylvania child 
endangerment statute was amended to state that any violation 
that posed “a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury” 
would make the offense a felony.  See Pa. Act of June 29, 2017, 
P.L. 246, No. 12 (H.B. 217) (noting previous statutory 
language).  Thus, a conviction under the felony provision of 
the endangerment statute would qualify as a crime of child 
abuse under the INA because it requires proof of a substantial 
risk of death or serious bodily injury.     
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qualify as INA child abuse.9  The Government argues that we 
are bound to undertake this analysis because Gonzalez v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007), dictates that there 
should be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility” 
that the state statute would be applied to such conduct.  
Resp’t’s Br. at 31. 
 
Contrary to the Government’s assertion, it is 
unnecessary to conduct a realistic probability inquiry in every 
case.  In Singh v. Attorney General, 839 F.3d 273, 285-86 (3d 
Cir. 2016), we held that the BIA erred in conducting a “realistic 
probability” inquiry where the elements of petitioner’s 
controlled substance conviction under Pennsylvania state law 
                                              
9 In its August 15, 2018 Rule 28(j) letter, the 
Government admitted that the “realistic probability” test is not 
necessary where the text of the statutory provision plainly 
covers a broader swath of conduct than the generic federal 
offense, but argued that the test is required in all other 
instances, seemingly regardless of how courts articulate the 
statute’s elements.  When pressed on this position at oral 
argument, the Government admitted that one could look to the 
elements courts apply in comparing the elements of a state 
offense with the generic federal offense, but nevertheless 
maintained that a realistic probability test was necessary here.  
Oral Argument at 18:40, Liao v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-1825, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17-
1825Liaov.AttyGenUSA.mp3.  For the reasons discussed in 
the text, we conclude that it is unnecessary to apply the realistic 
probability test where the elements of the offense, whether as 
set forth in a statute or case law, do not match the generic 
federal crime.  
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did not match the elements of the generic federal offense of 
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance because it was only 
appropriate to apply such an analysis where the elements of the 
compared offenses matched.  Moreover, we observed that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has never conducted a ‘realistic 
probability’ inquiry” where the elements of the crime of 
conviction are not the same as the elements of the generic 
federal offense.10  Id. at 286 n.10; see also Salmoran v. Att’y 
Gen., No. 17-2683, 2018 WL 6166242, at *7 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 
2018) (holding that no realistic probability analysis is 
necessary where the state statute “plainly encompasses more 
conduct than its federal counterpart”). 
 
In this case, we are not confronted with a situation in 
which there is no guidance as to how the statute applies.  As 
explained above, Pennsylvania does not require any particular 
level of risk to violate its child endangerment statute, and thus, 
there is a difference between the risk element under the 
Pennsylvania child endangerment statute and the INA child 
abuse statute, making further inquiry into the law’s application 
unnecessary.  Put simply, the elements leave nothing to the 
“legal imagination,” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, because 
they show that one statute captures conduct outside of the 
other.  Therefore, we need not carry out a “realistic probability” 
inquiry to conclude that a conviction for a violation of 
                                              
10 Only where the state statute offers insufficient 
guidance as to its application is further analysis needed to 
address whether the state applied its statute in a way that 
captured conduct outside of the federal statute’s scope.  
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191-95; Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 
193. 
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§ 4304(a)(1) does not constitute a removable “crime of child 
abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).11  
                                              
11 Our sister circuit courts have also held that the 
“realistic probability” inquiry is unnecessary where the 
elements of the offenses do not match.  See Hylton v. Sessions, 
897 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (evaluating whether a state 
conviction for sale of marijuana in the third degree constituted 
an INA aggravated felony, and concluding that “[b]y 
demanding that Hylton produce old state cases to illustrate 
what the statute makes punishable by its text, the 
Government’s argument misses the point of the categorical 
approach and wrenches the Supreme Court’s language in 
Duenas Alvarez from its context” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)); United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 
1274-75 (10th Cir. 2017) (determining applicability of Armed 
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentencing enhancement 
based on prior convictions, and concluding, in spite of 
Government’s contention that a “realistic probability” inquiry 
was necessary, that “[t]his is not a case where we need to 
imagine hypothetical non-violent facts to take a statute outside 
of the ACCA’s ambit. . . . The Government gives no persuasive 
reason why we should ignore [the statute’s] plain language to 
pretend [it] is narrower than it is.”); Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 
62, 66 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[Duenas-Alvarez’s] sensible caution 
against crediting speculative assertions regarding the 
potentially sweeping scope of ambiguous state law crimes has 
no relevance to a case like this [where the state law at issue 
unambiguously covered one drug not on the federal schedules, 
as relevant for removal eligibility under the INA].  The state 
crime at issue clearly does apply more broadly than the 
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federally defined offense.”); United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 
740 F.3d 152, 157-58 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting 
Government’s argument that a “realistic probability” inquiry is 
necessary because “this case does not require an exercise of 
imagination, merely mundane legal research skills: we have 
precedent from Maryland’s highest court” confirming that the 
state offense of resisting arrest captures conduct outside the 
scope of “crimes of violence” under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines); Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 
1071-72 (11th Cir. 2013) (examining whether a state theft 
conviction qualified as an aggravated felony rendering an alien 
removable under the INA and observing that “Duenas-Alvarez 
does not require [a realistic probability] showing when the 
statutory language itself, rather than ‘the application of legal 
imagination’ to that language, creates the ‘realistic probability’ 
that a state would apply the statute to conduct beyond the 
generic definition.”); United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 
850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (evaluating whether Oregon 
second-degree burglary conviction fell under the ACCA’s 
“violent felony” mandatory minimum, and noting “[w]here, as 
here, a state statute explicitly defines a crime more broadly 
than the generic definition, no ‘legal imagination’ is required 
to hold that a realistic probability exists that the state will apply 
its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of 
the crime.” (internal citation omitted)). But see United States 
v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 222, 239 (5th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (applying the “realistic probability” test to hold that a 
Texas conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm 
constituted an aggravated felony for sentencing purposes, even 
though it would, as the dissent explained, “require a defendant 
to disprove the inclusion of a statutory element that the statute 
plainly does not contain”). 
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IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition and 
remand for the BIA to consider the alternative ground on which 
the IJ found Liao removable. 
